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A Reply to Professor Craver: Physicians in
Private Practice Already Have
Enough Power
By STANTON A. GLANTZ*
S INCE early in this century American physicians have expanded the
scientific basis for their work and have argued successfully that, because
of the resulting technical complexity, public protection requires that the
states give the medical profession broad powers to regulate itself by
limiting the number of medical schools' and that physicians enjoy a near
monopoly in the sale of health services through state licensing. 2 Medical
society control of entry and of professional discipline combined with the
fee-for-service payment system allows individual physicians professional
and economic autonomy. The individual physician's independence, how-
ever, is diminishing, owing to the rising cost of health care to the public
and the rising cost of malpractice insurance to the practitioners both of
which one can attribute to the medical profession's failure to meet its
public responsibilities. Congress now requires institutionalized peer re-
view of physicians treating Medicare and Medicaid recipients to see that
these patients receive medically justified care. For their part, the courts
are holding hospitals liable for failing to supervise the medical proce-
* B.S., 1969, University of Cincinnati; M.S., 1970, Ph.D., 1973 (Applied Me-
chanics and Engineering-Economic Systems), Stanford University; Postdoctoral fellow-
ship in Cardiology, 1973-75, Stanford University Medical Center. Dr. Glantz is cur-
rently a Senior Fellow of the Bay Area Heart Research Committee at the University
of California, Division of Cardiology, San Francisco.
1. See A. FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA:
A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING 14-18
(1910); R. STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 55-74 (1971).
2. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2141 (West 1974). But see id. §§ 2139-40
(granting practice privileges to chiropodists and midwives).
3. See Schwartz, Will Malpractice Socialize U.S. Medicine?, MED. ECON., Aug.
18, 1975, at 114, 115-17.
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320(c) (Supp. m, 1973); Goran, Roberts, Kellogg, Fielding
& Jessee, The PSRO Hospital Review System, 13 MED. CARE, April, 1975, Supp. at 1-2
[hereinafter cited as Goran, Roberts, Kellogg, Fielding & Jessee].
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dures carried out within their premises, 5 and the fear of this liability has
motivated hospitals to convene peer review committees to maintain the
quality of service. The advantages of specialization have spurred the
growth of group practice,6 with its resulting encumbrances. All these
changes limit somewhat the private physician's autonomy, but even so,
the medical profession and its members enjoy a degree of independence
well beyond the reach of other workers. Nevertheless, some physicians
see their livelihoods threatened by the encroachments of stronger peer
review, group practice, insurance companies, and government regula-
tion, and they have formed unions to protect themselves. 7 Such unions
probably are subject to liability under the antitrust laws, and, conse-
quently, Professor Craver argues that the law should be amended or
construed to provide physicians in private practice "rights and protec-
tions generally available to regular workers." 8
Craver's arguments overlook three important facts. First, the insti-
tutional changes which the doctors denounce merely represent a shift in
power from the individual physician to the medical profession as a
whole. Second, physicians directly influence the demand for their own
services through such actions as instructing a patient to make a return
visit, admitting a patient to the hospital, and deciding to administer an
extended course of therapy.9 Third, because society deems the doctors'
special skills so important, the state already provides the medical profes-
sion with a legally protected monopoly which gives physician "workers"
powers far beyond anything a normal union could desire. We have long
awaited the changes in our health care system designed to assure better
quality and cost control, and it is not in the public interest to amend the
labor and antitrust laws to expand the power of private practice physi-
5. See Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972); Darling
v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Moore v. Board of Trustees of Carson-Tahoe Hosp., 88
Nev. 207, 495 P.2d 605, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 879 (1972); Pederson v. Dumouchel,
72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967).
6. See Group Practice Doctor's Income, MED. WORLD NEWS, Feb. 10, 1975, at
111.
7. See, e.g., Alper, Why I Joined a Union, PRISM, May, 1974, at 26; Marcus,
A Vote for Unionism, AM. MED. NEws, Aug. 7, 1972 (letter to the editor); Peterson,
Why I Changed My Mind on Doctors' Unions, MED. OPINION, July 1973, at 48-51.
8. Craver, The Application of Labor and Antitrust Laws to Physician Unions:
The Need for a Re-Evaluation of Traditional Concepts in a Radically Changing Field,
27 HASTINGS L.J. 55, 59 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Craver].
9. See V. FuciS & M. KRAMER, DETERMINANTS OF EXPENDnTURES FOR PHYSI-
CIANS' SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES 1948-1968, at 1-3, 14-17, 41 (Nat'l Bureau of
Economic Research Occasional Paper No. 117, 1973).
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cians to oppose these changes. If anything, the antitrust laws should be
strengthened to foster more competition in medical practice.
When one discusses the issue of physicians' unions, one must
distinguish between those physicians who are bona fide salaried employ-
ees and those who are independent contractors using an institution's
facilities to earn part of their livelihoods. The former group, which has
voluntarily relinquished some of its professional autonomy, already
enjoys the benefits of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),' 0 and
rightly so. Like any other employees, they deserve protection from their
employers' capricious actions. The fact that they have given up fee-for-
service private practice demonstrates that they have relatively little con-
cern over the questions which motivate private physicians to unionize."1
Thus, we will focus on the latter group, the physicians in private practice
who feel their state-created monopoly does not give them sufficient
leverage to protect their own and their patients' interests.
The actual changes in our health care system to date have been
much smaller than Craver suggests. Physician-controlled Blue Cross
remains the nation's largest single third-party carrier,' 2 physician-con-
trolled Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs) are still
in the organizational stages,"3 and not one Health Maintenance Organi-
zation (HMO) has yet qualified for federal certification. 4 Public state-
ments by leaders of fledgling physicians' unions, however, reveal that
the leaders expect more drastic changes. A journalist sympathetic with
physicians' views summarized what these leaders fear most:
A nationalized health service in this country would consist of sal-
aried physicians serving in those places, at those times, and in those
10. See Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395, amending 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 151-68 (1973 & Supp. 1975).
11. See generally Colombotos, Kirchner & Millman, Physicians View National
Health Insurance: A National Study, 13 MED. CARE, May, 1975, at 369 thereinafter
cited as Colombotos, Kirchner & Millman]. The authors' findings support the proposi-
tion that the method by which a physician is paid affects his views on health care issues.
For instance, the authors' survey showed that salaried physicians (hospital-based) fa-
vored some form of national health insurance nearly 50% more often than did office-
based physicians. Id. at 385.
12. See Bodenheimer, Cummings & Harding, Capitalizing on Illness: The Health
Insurance Industry, 4 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVICES 583, 584 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Bodenbeimer, Cummings & Harding].
13. See Goran, Roberts, Kellogg, Fielding & Jessee, supra note 4, at 1-2.
14. Thanks to the lobbying by various medical special interest groups, the require-
ments in terms of benefits and rate structures are much more stringent than those that
apply to fee-for-service organizations. iSee Dorsey, The Health Maintenance Organiza-
tion Act of 1973 (P.L. 93-222) and Prepaid Group Practice Plans, 13 MED. CARE, Jan.,
1975, at 1, 8.
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fashions that they are ordered to serve . . . The Government
would seek to assure what the bureaucrats regard as a proper geo-
graphical and specialty distribution of physicians. Precise tables
of organization would dictate how many primary physicians, gen-
eral surgeons, urologists, radiologists, pathologists, and other spe-
cialists would be assigned to each community. The procedures
each type of doctor might perform would be sharply defined so that
primary physicians would not take out appendixes, gallbladders,
or even tonsils.
There would be no need for P.S.R.O. as it now exists. In-
stead, the Government would insist that its physician-employees
treat as many diseases as possible by use of specific clinical algor-
ithms-"cookbook medicine" if you please-in an effort to get
uniformity of therapeutic approach. Computerized patient records
would be relied upon to assure continuity of care, since a nation-
alized health service with doctors punching time clocks couldn't
even attempt to foster, let alone preserve, the substantial degree of
personal physician-patient relationship that still remains in Ameri-
can medicine.
For those patients with the right ailments-a simple fracture
clearly visible on an X-ray or a pneumonia readily responsive to a
specific antibiotic-the care might not be too bad. But for those
with difficult, time-consuming problems that resist easy definition
or solution, and for those who need emotional support as well as ef-
ficiency, this system could seem like a medical hell designed by
Franz Kafka.' 5
With this situation looming on the horizon, some physicians feel
that they need a union's economic power in addition to their state-
created monopoly, to protect themselves and their patients. Empirical
evidence, however, suggests that these fears will not materialize. William
Glaser, after studying medical payment systems and organization in
every major nation in Europe and the Middle East,16 concluded:
Doctors' work is indispensable to the survival and efficiency of peo-
ple in every social system. Skills and judgment of such a high
order are scarce, require much training, and attract general respect
from the public and from leaders of the government. Organiza-
tions of the profession influence recruitment and prices. In prac-
tice, the medical profession acquires a powerful voice in the policies
and management of national medical care systems in addition to
the clinical services that are its recognized preserve. Consequently,
the medical profession eventually manages to ensure that these sys-
tems do not operate to its disadvantage in any way.' 7
15. Schwartz, Will Malpractice Socialize U.S. Medicine?, MFD. EcON., Aug. 18,
1975, at 114, 117-18.
16. See W. GLASER. PAYING THE DOCTOR 4-5 (1970) [hereinafter cited as GLA-
sa]. Glaser examined the health care systems in Cyprus, Egypt, England, France, Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, The Netherlands, Poland,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, USSR.
17. Id. at 172.
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Thus, while doctors may find their individual autonomy circumscribed
in the future, there is little possibility that professional organizations will
not adequately represent their collective interests. As for the economic
question, Glaser found: "Medicine is one of the highest paid occupa-
tions in every country, regardless of whether the medical services are
public or private and regardless of the method of payment."' 8
The Imagined Threat from Health Insurance Carriers
A feeling of powerlessness when dealing with the large health
insurance carriers provides one of the strongest motivations for the
private practitioner to unionize. 9 The logic, as Craver points out, 0 is
that an individual physician has no real economic leverage when acting
alone against the concentrated power of a third-party carrier. But who
are these carriers?
During the Depression, physicians noticed that many people were
too poor to seek medical care or to pay their doctor bills. State medical
associations developed Blue Shield, for example, so that patients would
pay monthly sums to Blue Shield, which would in turn reimburse
doctors for their services. Blue Shield insures sixty-five million people
for medical and surgical care and handles thirteen million Medicare and
Medicaid patients.21 Today, state or local medical societies still control
most Blue Shield plans. In 1970, two-thirds of all Blue Shield board
members were doctors.22 Of the twenty-one California Blue Shield
directors, nineteen are physicians, and all are nominated and elected by
the house of delegates of the California Medical Association (CMA).23
Thus, if Blue Shield were as insensitive to the needs of the medical
community as the proponents of unionization would have us believe, one
wonders why the medical association does not nominate and elect a
board more sympathetic to its members' goals.
Rather than arbitrarily setting fees, Blue Shield goes to great
lengths to determine each doctor's "usual and customary" fee for a given
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Alper, Why I Joined a Union, Plusm, May, 1974, at 26, 28; Nav-
arro, Social Policy Issues: An Explanation of the Composition, Nature, and Functions
of the Present Health Sector of the United States, 51 BULL. N.Y. AcAD. MED. 199, 216
(1975); Peterson, Why I Changed My Mind on Doctors' Unions, MED. OPINION, July,
1973, at 4849.
20. See Craver, supra note 8, at 59.
21. Bodenheimer, Cumming & Harding, supra note 12, at 584.
22. Id. at 588.
23. Id.
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service. 24 For example, in California, the entire payment system is based
on reports prepared periodically by a committee of the CMA, whose
delegates elect the California Blue Shield directors. These reports, called
the California Relative Value Studies (RVS),25 catalogue medical serv-
ices and procedures along with a code number and a unit value repre-
senting the median relative physician charge for each service compared
with other services in the same category.26 While the RVS is not a fee
schedule, but rather a technique for describing a physician's services, it
often serves as a fee-setting guide after an individual physician decides
what one relative value study unit of his service costs. 2 7 Within this
framework, when a physician under contract with Blue Shield sees a
Blue Shield subscriber, he bills Blue Shield, not the patient, by sending
in the RVS code with his bill. Blue Shield then pays the doctor his
"usual and customary" fee, essentially the lesser of (1) the billed
amount, or (2) his median charge for the same service, or (3) the
median charge for all physicians in his area for the same service. About
once a year Blue Shield recomputes each physician's "usual and custom-
ary" fees. Thus, when a physician sends in a bill above his current
"usual and customary" fee, although he will not be reimbursed the full
amount, he knows he is building a basis for raising his and his col-
leagues' "usual and customary" fees for the following year.2 ' No physi-
cian, however, has to deal with Blue Shield. If he wishes, he may simply
bill his patients at whatever rate he chooses and let them worry about
collecting from Blue Shield.29 Since the Medicare bill" stated specific-
ally that it was not to interfere with the existing delivery system,32
Medicare reimbursement to fee-for-service physicians works according
to the Blue Shield formula.
Unlike Blue Shield, the private insurance companies, whose total
business is somewhat greater than that of both Blue Cross and Blue
Shield, 2 contract directly with the patient, not with the physician. 3
Generally, these policies reimburse the patient either a fraction of the
24. See id.
25. See CALwoFmOA MEDicA.L ASS'N COMM. ON RELATIE VALUE STUDiEs, 1969
CALIFORNIA RELATIVE VALUE STUDIES.
26. Id. at 6.
27. Id. at 7, 119.
28. See Bodenheimer, Cummings & Harding, supra note 12, at 588.
29. Id.
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-9511 (1970) as amended (Supp. I1, 1973).
31. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395 (1974).
32. See, e.g., Bodenheimer, Cummings & Harding, supra note 12, at 588.
33. Id. at 589.
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patient's bills (for example, 80 percent) or a set amount, depending on
the procedure. Unlike Blue Shield, these insurance companies sometimes
do not tie their reimbursement schedules to doctors' fees, leaving irate
patients only partially covered.3 4 While this situation has doubtlessly led
to friction between patients and physicians because the patients erron-
eously believed themselves to be fully insured, the insurance contract is
between the patient and the carrier, not the physician and the carrier.
Thus, the physician is left to set his fees as he wishes and collect as
best as he can. Competition with Blue Shield, however, has tended
to force the private insurance companies to follow Blue Shield's policy. 5
Since the physician is not a party to the insurance contract, one is left
wondering what role a union would play in negotiating on the
physicians' behalf with the private insurance companies. Would the
union demand that patient coverage be increased to insure that patients
would not have to pay anything and thus to guarantee more reliable
collections of the entire fee the physician sets for himself?
The Supposed Threat of Government Health
Insurance Systems
Perhaps Medicaid (Medi-Cal in California) provides the greatest
source of irritation for the medical community because of its relatively
tight fiscal control. For example, although Medi-Cal uses the Blue
Shield reimbursement mechanism, the basic rate structure has been
permitted only one 2 1/2 percent general rate increase since 1970,
although specific increases have been permitted to pass along higher
costs. Thus, physicians make less money from Medi-Cal than they
would by delivering the same services to regular patients. While this
situation may seem unjust, the state does not require anyone to see
Medi-Cal patients. Indeed, many physicians have found that Medicaid
patients can provide a sort of guaranteed annual income during reces-
sionary periods, when paying patients tend to stay away.3 6
By fixing payment according to the "usual and customary" fees
which the physicians themselves can increase by simply submitting
higher bills, the fee-for-service method contains a powerful incentive for
physicians to deliver more medical services than the patient's needs
justify. Dr. Paul Hawley, while Director of the American College of
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. See Eisenberg, Is the Doctor Business Recession-Proof?, MED. EcoN., May 26,
1975, at 132-51.
November 1975] PHYSICIAN UNIONS: A REPLY
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Surgeons, observed: "One-half of the surgical operations in the United
States are now performed by doctors who are untrained, or inadequately
trained, to undertake surgery. Inadequately trained physicians are doing
an increasing amount of surgery because every insured patient is a
paying patient. '3 7 In 1956, the United Mine Workers' health care
program's benefits for procedures performed by specialists were limited
to operations actually performed by board certified surgeons. The union
found that surgical rates declined by one-half within three months." In
1972, a New York City union instituted a policy conditioning reim-
bursement for elective surgery on a second medical opinion that the
operation was necessary; their elective surgery rate dropped 17.5 per
cent.39 It has been estimated that two million operations (about 16
percent of all surgery) are entirely unnecessary; these operations ac-
count for at least 24,000 deaths annually.40 While these practices are
matters of common knowledge within the medical community, neither
the medical societies nor Blue Shield (and hence Medicare) require
even a second opinion to receive reimbursement for an operation.
Less dramatic, but no less widespread, is the practice of providing
unnecessary office and nursing home visits to patients, especially those
covered by Medicare and Medicaid:
For example, a fee-for-service group practice comprising Board
qualified and certified physicians, a large percentage of whose
practice was Medicaid, billed [New York City] for an inordinate
number and percentage of referrals to the group otolaryngologist,
gynecologist, urologist, pediatrician, allergist, etc. It was standard
procedure for the intake group pediatrician to refer to the group
otolaryngologist almost every child with uncomplicated acute otitis
media. The otolaryngologist received a $20 Medicaid consultation
fee which was then presumably pooled in the group's income. 41
Similar practices nationwide not only expose patients to risks associated
with unnecessary medical procedures, 42 but also cost the taxpayer dear-
37. Address by Dr. Paul Hawley, Group Health Institute, May 1959, in R. BLUM,
THE COMMONSENSE GUIDE TO DocToRs, HOsPITALS, AND MEDICAL CARE 34 (1964).
38. See Kerr, Medical Care Innovations of the UMWA Welfare and Retirement
Fund, in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE-LA-
BOR SEMINAR ON CONSUMER HEALTH SERVICES 105 (1968).
39. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1975, at 34, col. 6.
40. See Washington Post, July 18, 1972, § A, at 1, col. 5.
41. Bellin & Kavaler, Medicaid Practitioner Abuses and Excuses vs. Counterstrat-
egy of the New York City Health Department, 61 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2201, 2204
(1971).
42. Members of the public tend to forget that risk accompanies any medical pro-
cedure, and they also tend to think, erroneously, that more medicine is better medicine.
For example, patients often glibly take antibiotics, but a study of prescribing habits in
[Vol. 27
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ly. In short, Medicare and Medicaid have exacerbated already strong
financial incentives for the medical community to perform, at higher
prices, more procedures than are medically justified. Physicians on
hospital utilization review committees and similar groups who work with
fiscal intermediaries have had little effect on costs.
4 8
The Exaggerated Burden of Peer Review
To understand why peer review mechanisms have had little impact
on the quality and cost of medical care under government sponsorship
and why Craver is incorrect in asserting that utilization review amounts
to supervision of medical practitioners, 44 let us examine how Medi-Cal's
physician utilization review works.
Blue Shield, the fiscal intermediary, designates physicians of the
same specialty in a locality as a peer group and then flags each provider
who, after allowing for the size and nature of each practitioner's patient
population, delivers a given service more often than 97.7 percent of his
peers.4 15 Thus Medi-Cal utilization review selects physicians with highly
unusual practice patterns for additional investigation. In the period of
July to September 1974, the 259 physicians who had unusual practice
patterns accounted for a substantial amount of money: providers show-
ing unusual practice patterns and having dollar values greater than
$5,000 per physician accounted for $1,301,539 in Medi-Cal billings
during this period.46 Despite the considerable amount of money in-
volved, the review process continues within Blue Shield, with no involve-
ment by state officials, except in those few cases of outright fraud.47 A
California Department of Finance Report explained that Blue Shield
analyzes the report of any provider with an unusual practice pattern and
excludes some of these practitioners from further investigation.
Reasons for discontinuing the review include insufficient information,
prior case information, and other knowledge of the provider.4 For those
Ohio revealed that 65.6% of the antibiotics were unnecessary or incorrectly administered
and that in 92% of the cases with adverse drug reactions to antibiotics, the prescription
was questionable or clearly faulty. See M. SiLvERmAN & P. Lun, PILLS, Pao'rrs AND
PoLrTIcs 290 (1974).
43. Panel Discussions on National Health Insurance Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 12-14 (1975)
(statement of Lowell E. Bellin) [hereinafter cited as Belin statement].
44. See Craver, supra note 8, at 57.
45. Aunrrs DIIsIoN, CALiFoRNA DP"r OF ,FINANc , A Rivmw or TH Mni-
CAL PROGRAM 108 (1974).
46. Id. at 109.
47. Id. at 110.
48. Id. at 110-11.
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cases the fiscal intermediary decides to monitor, a mechanism is trig-
gered which flags all claims submitted. These claims are reviewed by the
medical review and audit department of Blue Shield or the local medical
foundation, which belongs to the physicians. This review is defined as
prospective peer review.4 9 While the physician is on prospective review,
attempts are made to educate him in regard to program benefits and
limitations.5 0 In addition, claims may be denied for excessive services, 5'
or the case may be referred to the local medical society for disciplinary
action. 2 On October 18, 1974, there were 233 providers on prospective
peer review.
53
From information furnished by the fiscal intermediary, the Depart-
ment of Finance could determine the effective date of prospective
review, and it concluded that the average length of time on review was
approximately fourteen months. 4 In some instances, providers had been
on review for as long as five years.5 5 The significance of this finding is
that the providers on review continue to treat patients and receive
payments from Medi-Cal even though their practices do not accord with
accepted practice in the area. 6
Thus, the utilization review process exerts virtually no control on
the practice of medicine by an individual practitioner. Furthermore, an
adverse decision-when one occurs--denies Medi-Cal payment to only
those physicians who are not practicing in accordance with 97.7 percent
of their peers.5 7 Like Blue Shield and Medicare, this review mechanism
contains built-in incentives for everyone to deliver more services because
then the scale against which everyone is compared will be pushed ever
higher. Finally, if an individual physician feels strongly about the appro-
priateness of a procedure and cannot convince his peers of its correct-
ness, he can simply bill the patient. In short, existing utilization review
procedures fail not only to constitute "supervision" of individual physi-
cians but also to insure that those treating patients with the public's
money do so in ways consistent with their peers' practices.
These problems are not unique to California. In 1971, the New
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 111.
54. Id. at 112.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 108.
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Mexico Department of Health and Social Services was virtually bankrupt
owing to overruns in the Medicaid program. 58 To save the program, the
department cut back on the scope and duration of benefits for fourteen
months so that the projected expenditures would not exceed the state's
budget.5 The department also hired a nonprofit organization of physi-
cians to provide peer review of all Medicaid claims to determine if the
services were medically necessary and appropriate. 60
Far from creating a Kafkaesque nightmare, these steps saved Medi-
caid in New Mexico. Since 1971, Medicaid in New Mexico has operated
within its budget, and the increase in costs, which are attributable to a
larger number of eligible beneficiaries, to increased benefits, and to
inflation, was only 50 percent, while Medicaid expenditures nationwide
have more than doubled.0 1 The length of the average hospital stay
decreased by 24 percent, at a savings of $2.5 million per year.62 Use of
injections during office visits decreased by two-thirds, at a savings of
$200,000 per year.68 Prescription drug costs were reduced 12 percent
the first year and another 5 percent the second year, and New Mexico
now spends less on drugs than it spent the year before the new approach
was taken, even though drug prices are higher and more people are
eligible for assistance.64
By institutionalizing physician peer review in a way responsible to
the state, not the medical society, New Mexico was able "to provide the
opportunity for quality medical care to eligible citizens .. .without
bankrupting the State."6 5 These steps were completed without turning
all of New Mexico's physicians into state employees. Again, the change
simply reflected a shift in autonomy and responsibility from the individ-
ual physician to the medical community as a whole.
Concern over skyrocketing costs in both the public and the private
sectors is beginning to produce demands for changing the system. Blue
Shield is under growing pressure from consumer groups and some state
insurance commissions to add consumers to their boards and use their
58. Panel Discussions on National Health Insurance Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 65-66 (1975)
(statement of Richard W. Helm).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 66-67.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 67.
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considerable economic leverage to reduce unnecessary medical proce-
dures. Private insurance companies, concerned about their profits, are
also trying to limit cost increases. 66 Perhaps most important, the political
alliance between the American Medical Association, the National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers, the United States Chamber of Commerce, and
the Republican Party has been crumbling under the pressures of ever
increasing medical care costs.67 Does the pressure from govern-
ment, consumers, and business justify permitting the individual physi-
cian to unionize? To gain perspective on this problem, let us return to
Glaser's study of medicine in Europe and the Middle East:
[A]uthoritarian and evolutionary solutions ultimately end at the
same point. Lest medical services be upset and lest they be
blamed, the government and sick funds create an administrative
structure and system of medical pay that is acceptable to the medi-
cal profession. Elaborate concessions are made to the profession's
demands for autonomy, resources, and incentives sufficient for fu-
ture recruitment. Standing consultative mechanisms are created.
Shortages of money and malfunctions touch off occasional disputes,
sometimes punctuated by extravagant rhetoric and strike threats,
but almost invariably the doctors obtain concessions in money and
procedure. Since money is limited, doctors rarely get paid as well
as they would like, but usually they gain more from the public au-
thorities than does any other private group.
68
It is against this background that one should examine the passage of
legislation establishing PSROs.
In 1970, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW) asked Congress for authority to establish so-called program
review teams of physicians and consumers to monitor federally funded
health programs and locate areas of abuse.69 The AMA reacted by
proposing that peer review organizations be established by the state
medical societies.70 Wallace Bennett, a Republican senator from Utah,
introduced the AMA proposal that ultimately became the PSRO provi-
sion by describing it as
66. See Bodenheimer, Cummings & Harding, supra note 12, at 593-95; N.Y.
Times, Aug. 4, 1975, at 34, col. 6.
67. See Panel Discussions on National Health Insurance Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 112-14 (1975)
(report of Pierre de Vise).
68. GLASER, supra note 16, at 137 (emphasis added).
69. Lander, PSROs: A Little Toe in the Door, HEALTH POLICY ADVISORY CENTER,
BULL. No. 59, July-Aug. 1974, at 2 [hereinafter cited as Lander].
70. Professional societies almost never pursue a policy of active case finding of
malefactors. At best, professional societies scrutinize only those cases brought to their
attention by complaints. This absence of case finding results in ineffective peer review.
Bellin statement, supra note 43, at 12.
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the best, and perhaps the last, opportunity to fully safeguard the
public concern with respect to the cost and quality of medical care
while, at the same time, leaving the actual control of medical prac-
tice in the hands of those best qualified-America's physicians. 71
Today physicians in 203 regions designated by HEW are forming
nonprofit corporations; membership in any region's organization is open
to any licensed doctors of medicine and osteopathy, and that organiza-
tion will be recognized as the area's PSRO. Each PSRO will develop
standards for practice in its area and review the performance of doctors
who treat patients under federally funded programs. Like the current
Medicare and Medicaid utlization review system, the PSRO will have
little effect on those physicians who do not participate in federal pro-
grams."2 In twenty-eight states (and in the District of Columbia) the
local PSRO encompasses the state's entire medical society, 73 with the
result that the PSRO will become the medical society under different
initials.7 4
Of the countries Glaser studied, every one which uses the fee-for-
service payment system has an organization similar to the PSRO to
gather statistics, and to educate and discipline physicians who deviate
too far from established medical practice.75 While the issue of PSROs
seriously divided the AMA76 and remains one of the major motivating
forces toward unionization, three-quarters of physicians interviewed in a
recent survey reacted favorably when asked if, when advising a commit-
tee planning a national health insurance program, they would prefer
institutionalized peer review similar to that embodied in the PSRO
concept. 77 The PSROs do come closer to "supervising" physicians in
their practices than previous peer review mechanisms, because they are
charged not only with flagging those physicians whose practice patterns
differ from those of their communities, but also with actually developing
standards of care and undertaking studies to highlight local medical
problems. The AMA and speciality societies are developing standards
and model procedures under contract with HEW, but it will be up to the
71. Id.
72. See Goran, Roberts, Kellogg, Fielding & Jessee, supra note 4, at 5.
73. Lander, supra note 69, at 7.
74. Bellin statement, supra note 43, at 13.
75. See GLAsER, supra note 16, at 150.
76. See Lander, supra note 69, at 7, 14-15; Reynolds, Is the AMA's Washington
Lobby Worth the Money?, MED. EcoN., May 12, 1975, at 35. The latter points out
that the split is between those opposed to compromise at any price and those urging the
AMA to make the best deal possible. Id. at 35.
77. See Colombotos, Kirchner & Millman, supra note 11, at 375-77.
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membership in each local PSRO to adopt those standards which it finds
most appropriate to its locality."' These standards are not legally bind-
ing on the individual physician but will help protect him from unjusti-
fied malpractice suits, since the law establishing PSROs provides that no
physician may be held civilly liable for action taken in compliance with
a PSRO's norms provided he exercises "due care.
79
Each PSRO will monitor hospital admissions and length of stay to
guarantee that they are medically justified, and PSRO approval will
insure federal reimbursement for a service. Nurses will probably handle
the lower level screening process, but only a physician has the authority
to challenge the decision of another physician. Most important, HEW
emphasizes the educational rather than punitive nature of PSRO
activities:
If a physician's pattern of practice indicates that he is delivering
excessive or insufficient health care or otherwise improperly treat-
ing his patients, his peers in the PSRO will advise the physician and
recommend appropriate remedies, such as professional consultation
and education. Only in rare cases would sanctions provided by
law be imposed .... 80
There is also an extensive appeals structure available to the challenged
physician, and the only real sanction the PSRO can employ is denial of
payment under a federal program. As with the old utilization review
system, the PSRO does not transform individual physicians into employ-
ees. Instead, it represents a modest attempt to force the medical commu-
nity to do a more systematic job of policing itself.
While physicians can be paid for PSRO work, they are often
expected to serve on hospital committees without pay to maintain admit-
ting privileges. This expectation has catalyzed unionization movements
among many private practitioners because they desire reimbursement for
these services. Craver argues that while serving on these committees, the
physicians are effectively employees of the hospital.81 National Labor
Relations Board General Counsel Peter Nash, however, denied an un-
fair labor practice complaint of a group of physicians who claimed that
their hospital was not negotiating in good faith on the issue of payment
for service on the hospital's utilization review committee. General
78. Goran, Roberts, Kellogg, Fielding & Jessee, supra note 4, at 3.
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-16(c) (Supp. III, 1973).
80. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, PSRO Questions & Answers,
DHEW Pub. No. (OS) 74-50001, Dec., 1973. See also Goran, Roberts, Kellogg, Field-
ing & Jessee, supra note 4, at 3.
81. See Craver, supra note 8, at 70.
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Counsel Nash recognized that a hospital exercises little control over the
actual committee work.8 2 Such committee service is analogous to that of
scientists who review their peer's work for publication in scientific jour-
nals. Scientists consider this activity, for which they are not paid, a re-
flection of their responsibility for professional quality control. Likewise,
physicians should view service on hospital committees as part of a phy-
sician's responsibility to his patients, for which the patients pay him, to
insure adequate standards at the hospital where he treats them. Finally,
Craver and the physicians who wish to force hospitals to pay them for
committee work overlook the fact that the hospital makes available, at
no cost to the physician, the materials, facilities, and personnel he uses
to earn part of .is income. At present income levels, unpaid hospital
committee service should not cause physicians any financial hardship.8"
Institutional changes such as the appearance of HMOs and the
growth in group practices have little to do with the question of whether
or not physicians in private practice should be permitted to unionize.
While the payment structure may influence whether or not there is a
tendency for excess delivery of medical services, as with a fee-for-serv-
ice system, or underutilization, as with a capitation system, 4 so long as
the organization remains under the control of the physician-owners, no
true employer-employee relationship exists.8 5 The fact that the physi-
cians surrender part of their professional autonomy to a group to im-
82. General Counsel Hospital Report, 88 LAB. RaL. REP. 8, 13 (1975).
83. In 1973 the median net income of all self-employed medical specialists was
$41,810. For those in corporate practice the figure was $65,000. The figure for self-
employed physicians represents median net earnings (gross income from practice less
tax-deductible professional expenses, but before income taxes); the figure for corporate
physicians represents median total compensation from practice (salary and bonuses plus
corporate profit sharing and pension plan contribution, but before taxes). Owens, How
Four Medical Specialties Compare Financially, MED. ECON., Apr. 14, 1975, at 76, 82.
84. Capitation involves the payment of a fixed sum of money per subscriber for
medical care during the period of coverage, regardless of the amount of care needed.
85. Nevertheless, organized medicine has secured laws that have discouraged de-
velopment of prepaid group practices. "A study of state legislation in 1969 found in
less than half the states was the situation sufficiently defined to enable prepaid con-
sumer-sponsored group practices to be developed without concern about possible legal
restraints. In some states, the law requires a majority of the board of directors of such
plans to consist of physicians, and in some there are requirements that all physicians in
an area have the privilege of joining the plan should they so desire. Other restrictions
hinged on organizational and fiscal requirements of the plans, including questions of lim-
ited liability, tax, and insurance." R. STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDIcnm AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREsT 423 n.10 (1971). See also Dorsey, The Health Maintenance Organization Act
of 1973 (P.L. 93-222) and Prepaid Group Practice Plans, 13 MED. CAnE, Jan., 1975,
at 1.
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prove their working conditions and increase their incomes"' does not
convert them into employees. Of course, were the physicians to become
bona fide employees of consumer-run health groups, they would al-
ready be covered by the NLRA.
Conclusion
Extending NLRA coverage to private physicians and giving them
antitrust immunity would further solidify their control in the health care
industry and make it easier for them to keep from the public the
information necessary intelligently to select a physician and a mode of
delivery. We have already seen how the profession has resisted meaning-
ful peer review and such medically reasonable procedures as requiring a
second opinion prior to elective surgery.
The experience of a Maryland consumer group illustrates how
organized medicine tries to keep important information from the public.
The Public Citizens Health Research Group circulated a questionnaire
to the physicians in a Washington, D.C., suburb asking whether or not
they were board certified, at which hospitals they practiced, whether or
not they made house calls, and what their fees were. The county medical
society circulated a letter saying that disclosure of this information
would constitute illegal advertising. After receiving responses from 25
percent of the physicians, the consumer group published their guide and
filed a lawsuit to overturn the laws under which the medical society
sought to prevent its members from disclosing this information.87 Al-
though the case is still in litigation, it is evident that if the medical
society were a union, its legal right to restrain trade would be
stronger.
With the movement toward national health insurance, we can
expect the cries of anguish from the medical community to grow, despite
the fact that 56 percent of physicians recently surveyed were in favor of
"some form" of insurance. 8 One study has revealed that physician
support for Medicare grew quickly after it was adopted in New York in
1965. While 38 percent supported it before passage, 70 percent were in
favor of it a year after passage and 92 percent favored it by 1970.89 The
86. In 1972, members of group practices earned an average of about $10,000 more
than physicians in sole practice. See Group Practice Doctor's Income: Higher than
Solo Practitioners, MED. WORLD NEWS, Feb. 10, 1975, at 111.
87. Public Citizen v. Commission on Medical Discipline, No. 74-56B (D. Md.,
filed Jan. 17, 1974).
88. Colombotos, Kirchner & Millman, supra note 11, at 372.
89. Id. at 371. Perhaps their growing acceptance was due to the fact that "the
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relatively strong support for national health insurance probably means
that when it does arrive, physicians will quickly adjust to the new
system. Perhaps, the American medical community is recognizing a
seemingly universal fact:
Participation in the decisions of public medical schemes and com-
mitment to the success of these programs will not cause the doctors
and the medical association to abandon self-interest. Like every
occupation in the public service, they seek higher pay and better
working conditions and argue that the nation will benefit through
better recruitment and improved performance. As the profession
becomes more involved in the management of the public system,
the leadership of the medical association changes: the demagogic
leaders of a self-centered interest group are replaced by men more
skilled in planning and committee work. But when the profession
feels it is not paid or appreciated enough, these leaders will again
assume the roles of militant and sometimes vitriolic spokesmen for
a pressure-group. If they do not, they will be beset by internal
rebellions within the medical association and breakaway societies.
These occasional outbreaks do not mean the doctors are more self-
centered or irreconcilable than other occupations in the public ser-
vice: their demands and threats are merely more publicized and
they are more successful in getting what they want.90
In sum, the way individual physicians practice medicine in Ameri-
ca is, at last, beginning to reflect the growing public demand for better
cost and quality control. The changes which have resulted, however,
have been and will probably continue to be limited to improvements
which involve better policing by the medical community itself.91 While
most physicians seem at least resigned to these changes, only about one-
third of the physicians questioned in a recent survey thought that cir-
cumstances could ever justify a doctors' strike.9 2 If this minority were
permitted to unionize, it could, under Local 24, International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. Oliver 11 and American Federation of Musicians
advent of Medicare and Medicaid produced a sharp increase in demand; physicians re-
sponded by raising their prices. This price increase, far from inducing physicians to
work more, made it possible for them to earn higher incomes while actually working
less." V. FUCHS & M. KRAMER, DETERMINANTS OF EXPENDITURES FOR PHYSICIANS'
SERvicEs N ThE UNrrmn STATES 1948-1968, at 19 (Nat'l Bureau of Economic Research
Occasional Paper No. 117, 1973).
90. GLASER, supra note 16, at 304.
91. Of those interviewed in a survey conducted in Rochester, New York, only
about 7% appear to want to remove control of medicine from the physicians; the re-
maining are about equally divided between complete physician control and control
shared between physicians and the general public. See Stratmann, Block, Brown &
Rozzi, A Study of Consumer Attitudes About Health Care: The Control, Cost, and Fi-
nancing of Health Services, 13 MED. CARE, Aug., 1975, at 659, 661.
92. See Colombotos, Kirchner & Millman, supra note 11, at 390-91.
93. 358 U.S. 283 (1959), see Craver, supra note 8, at 90.
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v. Carroll,94 thwart efforts to bring new public accountability to medi-
cine. Most important, the unique skills and training the physician pos-
sesses have led the states to give his profession tremendous autonomy in
managing its own affairs, and the changes motivating the unionization
movement merely represent a shift in authority from the individual
physician to his profession as a whole. Dr. Sanford A. Marcus, presi-
dent of the American Union of Physicians, observed: "[W]e must ack-
nowledge, if sadly, that logic and political persuasion are no longer po-
tent enough for 300,000 physicians to counter the will of 200 million
Americans and the entire thrust of recent world history."9 5 His state-
ment eloquently summarizes why Congress and the courts should not
facilitate private practice physician unions.
94. 391 U.S. 99 (1968), see Craver, supra note 8, at 90-91.
95. Marcus, A Vote for Unionism, AM. Mnr. NEws, Aug. 7, 1972 (letter to the
editor).
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